Agent Principal Profiles: One Agent Across Platforms and Resource Domains
Thirty agents behind one platform client look like one caller, and a client per agent loses its restrictions when the agent moves. An enterprise can already map several workloads to one agent in its own IAM. What is missing is a contract that independent IdPs, platforms, and resource domains share, and Agent Principal Profiles propose one. The enterprise IdP resolves execution evidence to an Agent Principal, authorizes each client’s use of it as a separate decision, and names it as the actor of an ID-JAG, or as the subject of a Workload Authorization Grant when it acts alone. Each resource domain correlates the principal and keeps its own decisions. The result is continuity of governance, not deployment assurance, and because the principal can be any governed workload, it extends the case for OAuth federation to enterprise API access generally.
Reading DeepSeek's Super-agent Design for Authority
DeepSeek’s Exploring Super-agent Design describes an always-on agent that turns events into work, and its prototype gives each piece of work a Ticket and a Mandate that the host enforces when work starts and resumes. Below the scheduler, Workers run as the operator’s OS user through one shared GitHub account, merge limits are prompt instructions, and a policy change doesn’t revoke work in flight. Following the paper’s own “silently reproduce and fix” policy through a bug report, a patch, a pull request, a comment asking to merge, and a withdrawal while a laptop is offline shows what a Mission changes at each step, and why it matters once work reaches systems DeepSeek doesn’t operate. Missions don’t govern information flow between tasks, and they constrain prompt injection rather than prevent it.
Domain Control, Portable Review, and the Runtime Question Both Leave Open
An enterprise approves an application and then repeats that approval in every provider’s console. CIMD gives those providers a common client identifier and metadata source, but not a common review decision, and not a registration that ends when the decision does. The proposed CIMD Software Statement profile lets a provider consume a review as an explicit, renewable condition of admission while it keeps its own authorization decision. The statement carries no metadata of its own and binds a trusted issuer’s review to the exact bytes of the client’s document. Among servers that already accept the reviewer, one review replaces repeated evidence gathering, a registration made from a statement lasts only as long as the statement, and an issuer can withdraw it early. Tenant permission, runtime instance identity, and access grants stay with their own layers.
In May I argued that client instances are actors, not new clients. An instance is still not a new client, but it is not an actor by virtue of being an instance. One installation of an agent harness can host an agent and its sub-agents, and the same agent can move from a laptop to a cloud VM, so instance evidence alone establishes neither actor identity nor delegated authority. The instance belongs beside the actor chain. The client endorses which attesters may speak for its instances, and the authorization server authenticates an instance by validating an attestation from one of them that it trusts and the instance’s proof of the attested key. Client Instance Identifiers gives the instance continuity within a lifecycle the deployment defines. That identity lets a company isolate one installation without blocking the client for everyone, though identifying an instance revokes nothing by itself.
Reference tables behind the AuthZEN and the Blueprint series: the full gap map from Blueprint components to AuthZEN workstreams, the Blueprint Alliance’s task-related requirements quoted in full, the Mission AuthZEN profile’s request members explained, and each requirement mapped to the Mission drafts with the author’s reference-test status.
An agent works two tickets and one customer withdraws. Stopping the first ticket’s remaining actions without disabling the agent or interrupting the second ticket requires every system to recognize which grants, approvals, and actions belong to the canceled work. This part grades the candidates for that shared record, argues for a Mission, and proposes tests that work whatever carries the task.
A supervisor should not have to approve the same refund in two gateways’ inboxes. Part one’s contract standardizes how enforcement points ask. It does not make two products agree on what a tool call means, what an approval is, which duties a permit carries, or what a token may hold. This part follows the refund through the workstreams that supply those meanings, then the levers that cut prompts and the rules that keep authority adjustable.
Agents turn enforcement into a fleet of gateways from different vendors. An enterprise should be able to add or replace a gateway without rebuilding how its policy is consulted or adopting another approval workflow. The Blueprint Alliance leaves that decision interface unspecified, and AuthZEN is the standard that fills it.
A Mission Proposal for the Personal Agent Protocol
A User wants a back-ordered jacket exchanged for at most $75 more and will be gone when the quote arrives. Under PAP the agent can confirm on its standing permission, but the store sees only a label and cannot check the limit. A proposed Mission extension lets the User approve the limit on the store’s page and the store enforce it: a $73 quote is confirmed without the User, a $90 quote is refused, and the task can be revoked without ending unrelated access.
The question worth asking about AAuth is not only whether the protocol is good. Kerberos won because of everything around the protocol: SSPI and GSS-API hid the mechanism from application developers, the LSA owned keys and ticket lifecycle, machine accounts existed as a side effect of domain join, Active Directory shipped the KDC by default, and SPNEGO made rollout incremental. Mapping that stack onto agents names the first control point in this series: the provider seam through which a harness or gateway acquires and presents credentials without exposing the mechanism to agent logic. MCP clients, SPIFFE, cloud identity systems, vendor brokers, and HTTP message-signature negotiation supply pieces, but no general seam composes them. That seam still cannot decide whose agent is running, which work is approved, or whether a resource permits one action. Those are separate records and decisions.