Continuity Is Not One Thing argues that delegated work poses four independently governed continuity questions, and it was written to age well: roles instead of versions and statuses, mechanisms named only where they prove a distinction, and the model stated once. This page is its working companion, and it makes the opposite trade. Everything here is built to be revised: the vocabulary that keeps the essay’s terms honest, the rubric for evaluating proposals the essay never mentions, the worked demonstrations, and the standards map with the versions and statuses that change faster than architecture. Read the essay for the model. Use this page at the review meeting.
The Objects
Continuity arguments slide when one word carries several objects. Six terms keep them apart:
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Fact | a proposition relevant to a decision: Alice initiated the work, this agent is the actor, this authority exists |
| Evidence | material offered to establish a fact |
| Artifact | the protocol object carrying evidence or a decision |
| Authoritative source | the party trusted, under the relying party’s policy, to assert a particular fact |
| Decision authority | the party entitled to decide for a target context |
| Joining authority | the decision point explicitly authorized to associate independently valid evidence with one decision context, scoped by fact types, targets, and revocation |
| State | mutable information a decision consults: grant status, risk signals, work status |
The separations do immediate work. A Transaction Token is an artifact carrying identity and authorization context; it is not the authority for either. An identity assertion is evidence, not permission. A token exchange is a protocol operation, not a semantic guarantee about what its output means. A Mission is state, which artifacts may reference but cannot be. And sender constraint validates an artifact’s presentation, never the truth of the facts inside it. A joining authority may associate facts it does not own; that entitlement is scoped, never ambient.
The Rubric
Any continuity proposal, draft, profile, or product feature can be evaluated with twelve questions. None of them requires accepting the four-question model, any particular record format, or any proposal of mine; they only require the proposal to say what it establishes and for whom.
| # | Question | What a good answer looks like |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | What fact does the mechanism establish? | one proposition, stated without protocol vocabulary |
| 2 | Who is entitled to establish it, under whose trust policy? | a named authoritative source, and the relying party’s policy that accepts it |
| 3 | Which party consumes it, at what protocol moment? | a verifier and a moment, issuance-time or action-time, never “everyone, always” |
| 4 | What is the semantic effect at the boundary? | for authority, preserve, attenuate, or decide anew; for other evidence, accepted, re-represented, freshly obtained, or rejected; with what actually crosses named |
| 5 | What is the evidence bound to? | presenter, audience, resource, request, and decision context, each explicit |
| 6 | Who may associate it with the other facts in a decision context, on what proof? | the fact’s own source committing its assertion, or a scoped joining authority applying a named association policy; matching identifiers are hints, never authorization to join |
| 7 | What prevents replay or stale reliance? | freshness semantics stated, not inherited from token expiry by accident |
| 8 | How do the fact, its evidence, and decisions from it end? | three clocks, each with an owner: state change, evidence expiry, decision staleness |
| 9 | What happens when evidence is missing, unknown, or incomparable? | declared failure behavior, failing closed, with staleness and outage bounds |
| 10 | What correlation or disclosure does it introduce? | identifiers scoped to audiences that need them, pairwise where durable |
| 11 | What decision record remains? | an anchor the verifier writes at verification time, joinable to the work |
| 12 | Which trust topology does it assume? | one issuer; many issuers under one governance root; a vendor-operated issuer governing tenant resources; or many roots, named explicitly, with the degradation across the other topologies stated |
A proposal that answers all twelve is evaluable whether or not it is good. A proposal that cannot answer numbers 1 and 2 is not yet a security mechanism; it is a data structure.
The rubric is the essay’s eight-element boundary contract in evaluation form:
| Contract element | Rubric questions |
|---|---|
| Fact semantics | 1 |
| Authority | 2 |
| Transition | 4 |
| Presentation | 5 |
| Correlation | 6, with 10 for its privacy cost |
| Applicability | 3 and 5 |
| Lifecycle | 7 and 8 |
| Failure and audit | 9 and 11 |
Question 12 is the deployment assumption beneath all eight.
Two Worked Evaluations
The rubric earns its keep on real work, so here it is applied to the two most instructive current drafts: one intra-domain propagation mechanism and one cross-domain re-issuance pattern. The point is not the verdicts, both drafts fare well, but that the rubric surfaces exactly where each one’s obligations end.
| # | Transaction Tokens | Identity Chaining |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Fact | transaction-scoped identity and authorization context for one call chain | a subject identity, with authorization evidence, arriving from another domain |
| 2. Authority | the domain’s transaction token service, under domain policy | the origin domain’s authorization server, under the target domain’s trust policy |
| 3. Verifier and moment | intra-domain workloads, during the call chain | the target domain’s authorization server, at its token endpoint |
| 4. Semantic effect | preserve: context crosses, the originating external grant does not extend | decide anew: the target issues its own authority from the evidence |
| 5. Bindings | trust-domain audience wall, transaction identity | audience-bound assertion addressed to the target authorization server |
| 6. Correlation | the token service, entitled by domain policy, commits identity and authorization context into one artifact at issuance | the exchange is the association act: the target authorization server joins the assertion’s subject to its own issuance |
| 7. Freshness | short-lived by design, scoped to the chain | short-lived assertion, consumed at exchange |
| 8. Lifecycle | ends with the call chain; immutable while it lives | assertion consumed at issuance; the minted authority runs on the target’s clocks |
| 9. Failure | absent context falls to local workload policy | untrusted issuer or namespace is a refusal, not a downgrade |
| 10. Privacy | context stays inside one trust domain by design | subject crosses domains; pairwise identifiers where the profile says so |
| 11. Audit | transaction context in workload decision logs | exchange records at both authorization servers |
| 12. Topology | one governance root by design; the audience wall is the boundary | many governance roots by purpose; within one root it reduces to ordinary exchange |
Two lessons generalize. Transaction Tokens answer every question inside one trust domain and go silent at its wall, which is not a defect but a scope statement the rubric makes visible. Identity Chaining answers the cross-domain questions precisely because it refuses to carry target-local authority, leaving the target’s decision where the essay’s model says it belongs.
The Working-Group Queue, Classified
The framing is testable against the official queue: if the taxonomy is right, every active OAuth working-group document should classify without forcing a fifth question, and the gaps the essay names should appear as absences. The full set of sixteen active documents, as of August 10, 2026:
| WG document | Status | Classification |
|---|---|---|
| Identity Chaining | RFC Editor queue, -17 | identity and authorization continuity, decided anew at the target |
| ID-JAG | WG document, -04 | identity continuity, toward a target-local decision |
| Transaction Tokens | WG last call, -11 | context carrier; semantic effect set by the trust-domain profile |
| Attestation-Based Client Authentication | WG document, -10 | presenter binding, runtime assurance |
| SPIFFE client authentication | WG document, -02 | presenter binding, workload-to-client join |
| RFC 7523 update | RFC Editor queue, -11 | presenter binding rail, maintenance |
| Client ID Metadata Document | WG document, -02 | admission, the prerequisite |
| Refresh Token and Authorization Expiration | WG document, -03 | lifecycle semantics; a contract element, not a crossing |
| Token Status List | RFC Editor queue, -21 | lifecycle status distribution; a contract element, not a crossing |
| SD-JWT VC | with the IESG, -18 | evidence representation, a carrier |
| First-party apps | waiting for write-up, -04 | ceremony interaction model, substrate |
| Cross-device flows BCP | RFC Editor queue, -16 | ceremony-channel integrity, the consent half the essay brackets |
| OAuth 2.1 | WG document, -15 | substrate consolidation; no continuity question |
| Browser-based apps BCP | RFC Editor queue, -27 | substrate maintenance |
| Security BCP update | WG document, -03 | substrate maintenance |
| JWT BCP update | IESG evaluation, -07 | substrate maintenance |
The test returns three results. Nothing in the queue breaks the taxonomy or demands a fifth question, and only three documents are answers to continuity questions; the rest classify as presenter binding, admission, carriers, lifecycle elements, and substrate, the categories the essay defines around the questions, with two documents standardizing contract elements that involve no boundary crossing at all. The queue’s center of mass is the precondition: three documents harden who presents, and the client, workload, and actor reconciliation gap is visible inside that cluster, since the workload joins to the client while actor evidence binds to neither. And the essay’s gap list appears as an absence pattern: request continuity exists only as an individual draft, while work continuity, joining authorities, comparison vocabularies, and derivation-graph revocation have no working-group document at all. Rerun this table each IETF cycle; a document that resists classification, or a new adoption inside a named gap, is exactly the correction this page exists to record.
The Map, With Dates
The essay’s map records each proposal’s primary role only. This one carries the churn, and it is dated so its staleness is measurable: statuses below are as of August 8, 2026.
The deployed substrate everything composes over:
| Mechanism | Where | What it supplies |
|---|---|---|
| Pushed and signed authorization requests | RFC 9126, RFC 9101, with RFC 9421 at the HTTP layer | request integrity and a back-channel carrier |
| Rich Authorization Requests | RFC 9396 | structured description of requested authority |
| Artifact carriers and digests | RFC 7519 JWT, RFC 7515 JWS, RFC 9068 JWT access tokens, RFC 8785 canonicalization | signed artifacts, and reproducible commitments for chain and definition digests |
| Selective disclosure | RFC 9901 SD-JWT | claim-level disclosure control |
| Resource Indicators | RFC 8707 | audience targeting at request time |
| Token Exchange | RFC 8693 | the exchange operation, semantics left to profiles |
| Sender constraint | RFC 9449 DPoP, RFC 8705 mTLS | key-bound presentation |
| Client authentication | RFC 7523 JWT assertions | the rail beneath presenter binding’s second layer |
| Step-up authentication | RFC 9470 | raising authentication strength within existing authority |
| Introspection and revocation | RFC 7662, RFC 7009 | issuer-local state reporting and termination |
| Discovery metadata | RFC 8414, RFC 9728 | issuer and resource declarations, including accepted authorization servers |
| Security event rails | RFC 8417 SETs, RFC 8935 and RFC 8936 delivery, RFC 9493 subject identifiers | the transport that lifecycle and risk signals ride |
| Transparency | RFC 9943 SCITT | independently verifiable registration of decision evidence |
| Security best current practice | RFC 9700 | the baseline threat posture |
The emerging continuity work, with the tracking detail the essay refuses to carry. The entries from my own program, the Identity Continuation Assertion, the Actor Profile with its proofs and receipts, the trust-framework, domain-authorized-issuer, and instance-identity drafts, the design sketches, and Mission-Bound Authorization, are disclosed here as in the essay:
| Work | Status, August 8, 2026 | Dimension served |
|---|---|---|
| Identity Chaining | RFC Editor queue, rev -17 | identity and authorization, cross-domain |
| Token Status List | RFC Editor queue | credential status at scale; offline descendants stay out of reach |
| Transaction Tokens | OAuth WG, last call | context propagation, intra-domain |
| ID-JAG | OAuth WG, -04 | identity, into a target authorization decision |
| Attestation-Based Client Authentication | OAuth WG | presenter binding, runtime assurance |
| SPIFFE client authentication | OAuth WG | presenter binding, workload-to-client join |
| Client ID Metadata Document | OAuth WG | admission, identity without registration |
| Refresh Token and Authorization Expiration | OAuth WG | authorization continuity, lifetime semantics |
| WIMSE architecture and workload credentials | WIMSE WG | workload identity beneath presenter binding |
| AuthZEN Authorization API | OIDF, Final, January 2026 | the decision wire enforcement points consult |
| OpenID Federation | OIDF, Final, February 2026 | cross-domain issuer trust and key resolution |
| UMA 2.0 | Kantara, Final | authorization, party-absent continuation |
| GNAP grant management | RFC 9635 | authorization, in-protocol grant continuation |
| Macaroons and Biscuit | deployed practice, non-IETF (Macaroons paper) | authorization, caveat-based holder attenuation |
| OpenID Connect Key Binding | OIDF draft 02, June 2026 | presenter binding |
| Delegate SD-JWT | individual draft, -00 | authorization, holder delegation |
| Delegated Refresh Tokens | individual draft, -05 | authorization, persistence |
| Identity Continuation Assertion | individual draft, -00 | identity, later hops |
| OAuth Actor Profile, with Actor Proofs and Actor Receipts | individual drafts, -00 | subject-and-actor representation, with per-hop evidence |
| Identity Assertion Trust Framework and Domain-Authorized Issuer | individual drafts | which issuers a domain accepts, for which namespaces |
| Client Instance Assertion and AI Agent Instance Profile | individual drafts | presenter binding, which instance runs |
| RAR-type metadata | individual draft | authorization-vocabulary discovery, toward the comparison-domain gap; also the challenge family’s remediation payload |
| Transaction-specific challenges | individual draft | authorization, remediation at the transaction grain |
| Transaction token chaining, with a cross-domain variant | individual drafts | context propagation across hops and domains |
| Deferred token response | individual draft | asynchronous approval completion |
| OpenID Authentication Token | pre-submission, intended for the OIDC WG | identity, authentication-event continuation |
| Authorization Request Delegation Chain | individual draft, -00 | request continuity |
| Attenuating agent tokens | individual draft | authorization, offline narrowing |
| Grant Management | OIDF draft | grant-level lifecycle, issuer-local |
| Shared Signals and CAEP | OIDF, Final | lifecycle and risk event transport |
| Design sketches | working-group discussion | presenter transitions |
| Mission-Bound Authorization | individual draft family, core plus companions | work continuity |
The gaps themselves, what no row supplies, live in the essay’s work list, where they belong to the argument rather than to the tracking. And this map is scoped to the four questions; the Mission-relationship view of the same territory, the full WIMSE and OpenID inventories, the 2026 agent-draft wave, and the substitution hazards, lives in the published standards map, reconciled on its own date.
Using the Kit
At a design review, walk the essay’s boundary contract at each boundary a change touches, then run the rubric here against whatever mechanism is proposed to fill its elements. At a standards review, the rubric is the comment template: a draft that cannot say what fact it establishes, for which verifier, with what failure behavior, is not ready for the argument about whether its answer is right. And when the map above disagrees with the datatracker, trust the datatracker and tell me; this page expects to be corrected, which is exactly the property the essay was built not to need.