Continuity Is Not One Thing argues that delegated work poses four independently governed continuity questions, and it was written to age well: roles instead of versions and statuses, mechanisms named only where they prove a distinction, and the model stated once. This page is its working companion, and it makes the opposite trade. Everything here is built to be revised: the vocabulary that keeps the essay’s terms honest, the rubric for evaluating proposals the essay never mentions, the worked demonstrations, and the standards map with the versions and statuses that change faster than architecture. Read the essay for the model. Use this page at the review meeting.

The Objects

Continuity arguments slide when one word carries several objects. Six terms keep them apart:

TermMeaning
Facta proposition relevant to a decision: Alice initiated the work, this agent is the actor, this authority exists
Evidencematerial offered to establish a fact
Artifactthe protocol object carrying evidence or a decision
Authoritative sourcethe party trusted, under the relying party’s policy, to assert a particular fact
Decision authoritythe party entitled to decide for a target context
Joining authoritythe decision point explicitly authorized to associate independently valid evidence with one decision context, scoped by fact types, targets, and revocation
Statemutable information a decision consults: grant status, risk signals, work status

The separations do immediate work. A Transaction Token is an artifact carrying identity and authorization context; it is not the authority for either. An identity assertion is evidence, not permission. A token exchange is a protocol operation, not a semantic guarantee about what its output means. A Mission is state, which artifacts may reference but cannot be. And sender constraint validates an artifact’s presentation, never the truth of the facts inside it. A joining authority may associate facts it does not own; that entitlement is scoped, never ambient.

The Rubric

Any continuity proposal, draft, profile, or product feature can be evaluated with twelve questions. None of them requires accepting the four-question model, any particular record format, or any proposal of mine; they only require the proposal to say what it establishes and for whom.

#QuestionWhat a good answer looks like
1What fact does the mechanism establish?one proposition, stated without protocol vocabulary
2Who is entitled to establish it, under whose trust policy?a named authoritative source, and the relying party’s policy that accepts it
3Which party consumes it, at what protocol moment?a verifier and a moment, issuance-time or action-time, never “everyone, always”
4What is the semantic effect at the boundary?for authority, preserve, attenuate, or decide anew; for other evidence, accepted, re-represented, freshly obtained, or rejected; with what actually crosses named
5What is the evidence bound to?presenter, audience, resource, request, and decision context, each explicit
6Who may associate it with the other facts in a decision context, on what proof?the fact’s own source committing its assertion, or a scoped joining authority applying a named association policy; matching identifiers are hints, never authorization to join
7What prevents replay or stale reliance?freshness semantics stated, not inherited from token expiry by accident
8How do the fact, its evidence, and decisions from it end?three clocks, each with an owner: state change, evidence expiry, decision staleness
9What happens when evidence is missing, unknown, or incomparable?declared failure behavior, failing closed, with staleness and outage bounds
10What correlation or disclosure does it introduce?identifiers scoped to audiences that need them, pairwise where durable
11What decision record remains?an anchor the verifier writes at verification time, joinable to the work
12Which trust topology does it assume?one issuer; many issuers under one governance root; a vendor-operated issuer governing tenant resources; or many roots, named explicitly, with the degradation across the other topologies stated

A proposal that answers all twelve is evaluable whether or not it is good. A proposal that cannot answer numbers 1 and 2 is not yet a security mechanism; it is a data structure.

The rubric is the essay’s eight-element boundary contract in evaluation form:

Contract elementRubric questions
Fact semantics1
Authority2
Transition4
Presentation5
Correlation6, with 10 for its privacy cost
Applicability3 and 5
Lifecycle7 and 8
Failure and audit9 and 11

Question 12 is the deployment assumption beneath all eight.

Two Worked Evaluations

The rubric earns its keep on real work, so here it is applied to the two most instructive current drafts: one intra-domain propagation mechanism and one cross-domain re-issuance pattern. The point is not the verdicts, both drafts fare well, but that the rubric surfaces exactly where each one’s obligations end.

#Transaction TokensIdentity Chaining
1. Facttransaction-scoped identity and authorization context for one call chaina subject identity, with authorization evidence, arriving from another domain
2. Authoritythe domain’s transaction token service, under domain policythe origin domain’s authorization server, under the target domain’s trust policy
3. Verifier and momentintra-domain workloads, during the call chainthe target domain’s authorization server, at its token endpoint
4. Semantic effectpreserve: context crosses, the originating external grant does not extenddecide anew: the target issues its own authority from the evidence
5. Bindingstrust-domain audience wall, transaction identityaudience-bound assertion addressed to the target authorization server
6. Correlationthe token service, entitled by domain policy, commits identity and authorization context into one artifact at issuancethe exchange is the association act: the target authorization server joins the assertion’s subject to its own issuance
7. Freshnessshort-lived by design, scoped to the chainshort-lived assertion, consumed at exchange
8. Lifecycleends with the call chain; immutable while it livesassertion consumed at issuance; the minted authority runs on the target’s clocks
9. Failureabsent context falls to local workload policyuntrusted issuer or namespace is a refusal, not a downgrade
10. Privacycontext stays inside one trust domain by designsubject crosses domains; pairwise identifiers where the profile says so
11. Audittransaction context in workload decision logsexchange records at both authorization servers
12. Topologyone governance root by design; the audience wall is the boundarymany governance roots by purpose; within one root it reduces to ordinary exchange

Two lessons generalize. Transaction Tokens answer every question inside one trust domain and go silent at its wall, which is not a defect but a scope statement the rubric makes visible. Identity Chaining answers the cross-domain questions precisely because it refuses to carry target-local authority, leaving the target’s decision where the essay’s model says it belongs.

The Working-Group Queue, Classified

The framing is testable against the official queue: if the taxonomy is right, every active OAuth working-group document should classify without forcing a fifth question, and the gaps the essay names should appear as absences. The full set of sixteen active documents, as of August 10, 2026:

WG documentStatusClassification
Identity ChainingRFC Editor queue, -17identity and authorization continuity, decided anew at the target
ID-JAGWG document, -04identity continuity, toward a target-local decision
Transaction TokensWG last call, -11context carrier; semantic effect set by the trust-domain profile
Attestation-Based Client AuthenticationWG document, -10presenter binding, runtime assurance
SPIFFE client authenticationWG document, -02presenter binding, workload-to-client join
RFC 7523 updateRFC Editor queue, -11presenter binding rail, maintenance
Client ID Metadata DocumentWG document, -02admission, the prerequisite
Refresh Token and Authorization ExpirationWG document, -03lifecycle semantics; a contract element, not a crossing
Token Status ListRFC Editor queue, -21lifecycle status distribution; a contract element, not a crossing
SD-JWT VCwith the IESG, -18evidence representation, a carrier
First-party appswaiting for write-up, -04ceremony interaction model, substrate
Cross-device flows BCPRFC Editor queue, -16ceremony-channel integrity, the consent half the essay brackets
OAuth 2.1WG document, -15substrate consolidation; no continuity question
Browser-based apps BCPRFC Editor queue, -27substrate maintenance
Security BCP updateWG document, -03substrate maintenance
JWT BCP updateIESG evaluation, -07substrate maintenance

The test returns three results. Nothing in the queue breaks the taxonomy or demands a fifth question, and only three documents are answers to continuity questions; the rest classify as presenter binding, admission, carriers, lifecycle elements, and substrate, the categories the essay defines around the questions, with two documents standardizing contract elements that involve no boundary crossing at all. The queue’s center of mass is the precondition: three documents harden who presents, and the client, workload, and actor reconciliation gap is visible inside that cluster, since the workload joins to the client while actor evidence binds to neither. And the essay’s gap list appears as an absence pattern: request continuity exists only as an individual draft, while work continuity, joining authorities, comparison vocabularies, and derivation-graph revocation have no working-group document at all. Rerun this table each IETF cycle; a document that resists classification, or a new adoption inside a named gap, is exactly the correction this page exists to record.

The Map, With Dates

The essay’s map records each proposal’s primary role only. This one carries the churn, and it is dated so its staleness is measurable: statuses below are as of August 8, 2026.

The deployed substrate everything composes over:

MechanismWhereWhat it supplies
Pushed and signed authorization requestsRFC 9126, RFC 9101, with RFC 9421 at the HTTP layerrequest integrity and a back-channel carrier
Rich Authorization RequestsRFC 9396structured description of requested authority
Artifact carriers and digestsRFC 7519 JWT, RFC 7515 JWS, RFC 9068 JWT access tokens, RFC 8785 canonicalizationsigned artifacts, and reproducible commitments for chain and definition digests
Selective disclosureRFC 9901 SD-JWTclaim-level disclosure control
Resource IndicatorsRFC 8707audience targeting at request time
Token ExchangeRFC 8693the exchange operation, semantics left to profiles
Sender constraintRFC 9449 DPoP, RFC 8705 mTLSkey-bound presentation
Client authenticationRFC 7523 JWT assertionsthe rail beneath presenter binding’s second layer
Step-up authenticationRFC 9470raising authentication strength within existing authority
Introspection and revocationRFC 7662, RFC 7009issuer-local state reporting and termination
Discovery metadataRFC 8414, RFC 9728issuer and resource declarations, including accepted authorization servers
Security event railsRFC 8417 SETs, RFC 8935 and RFC 8936 delivery, RFC 9493 subject identifiersthe transport that lifecycle and risk signals ride
TransparencyRFC 9943 SCITTindependently verifiable registration of decision evidence
Security best current practiceRFC 9700the baseline threat posture

The emerging continuity work, with the tracking detail the essay refuses to carry. The entries from my own program, the Identity Continuation Assertion, the Actor Profile with its proofs and receipts, the trust-framework, domain-authorized-issuer, and instance-identity drafts, the design sketches, and Mission-Bound Authorization, are disclosed here as in the essay:

WorkStatus, August 8, 2026Dimension served
Identity ChainingRFC Editor queue, rev -17identity and authorization, cross-domain
Token Status ListRFC Editor queuecredential status at scale; offline descendants stay out of reach
Transaction TokensOAuth WG, last callcontext propagation, intra-domain
ID-JAGOAuth WG, -04identity, into a target authorization decision
Attestation-Based Client AuthenticationOAuth WGpresenter binding, runtime assurance
SPIFFE client authenticationOAuth WGpresenter binding, workload-to-client join
Client ID Metadata DocumentOAuth WGadmission, identity without registration
Refresh Token and Authorization ExpirationOAuth WGauthorization continuity, lifetime semantics
WIMSE architecture and workload credentialsWIMSE WGworkload identity beneath presenter binding
AuthZEN Authorization APIOIDF, Final, January 2026the decision wire enforcement points consult
OpenID FederationOIDF, Final, February 2026cross-domain issuer trust and key resolution
UMA 2.0Kantara, Finalauthorization, party-absent continuation
GNAP grant managementRFC 9635authorization, in-protocol grant continuation
Macaroons and Biscuitdeployed practice, non-IETF (Macaroons paper)authorization, caveat-based holder attenuation
OpenID Connect Key BindingOIDF draft 02, June 2026presenter binding
Delegate SD-JWTindividual draft, -00authorization, holder delegation
Delegated Refresh Tokensindividual draft, -05authorization, persistence
Identity Continuation Assertionindividual draft, -00identity, later hops
OAuth Actor Profile, with Actor Proofs and Actor Receiptsindividual drafts, -00subject-and-actor representation, with per-hop evidence
Identity Assertion Trust Framework and Domain-Authorized Issuerindividual draftswhich issuers a domain accepts, for which namespaces
Client Instance Assertion and AI Agent Instance Profileindividual draftspresenter binding, which instance runs
RAR-type metadataindividual draftauthorization-vocabulary discovery, toward the comparison-domain gap; also the challenge family’s remediation payload
Transaction-specific challengesindividual draftauthorization, remediation at the transaction grain
Transaction token chaining, with a cross-domain variantindividual draftscontext propagation across hops and domains
Deferred token responseindividual draftasynchronous approval completion
OpenID Authentication Tokenpre-submission, intended for the OIDC WGidentity, authentication-event continuation
Authorization Request Delegation Chainindividual draft, -00request continuity
Attenuating agent tokensindividual draftauthorization, offline narrowing
Grant ManagementOIDF draftgrant-level lifecycle, issuer-local
Shared Signals and CAEPOIDF, Finallifecycle and risk event transport
Design sketchesworking-group discussionpresenter transitions
Mission-Bound Authorizationindividual draft family, core plus companionswork continuity

The gaps themselves, what no row supplies, live in the essay’s work list, where they belong to the argument rather than to the tracking. And this map is scoped to the four questions; the Mission-relationship view of the same territory, the full WIMSE and OpenID inventories, the 2026 agent-draft wave, and the substitution hazards, lives in the published standards map, reconciled on its own date.

Using the Kit

At a design review, walk the essay’s boundary contract at each boundary a change touches, then run the rubric here against whatever mechanism is proposed to fill its elements. At a standards review, the rubric is the comment template: a draft that cannot say what fact it establishes, for which verifier, with what failure behavior, is not ready for the argument about whether its answer is right. And when the map above disagrees with the datatracker, trust the datatracker and tell me; this page expects to be corrected, which is exactly the property the essay was built not to need.