The architecture chapter
carries the argument, the
Building Mission-Bound Authorization
chapter carries the controls this appendix accompanies, and the
Field Reference
carries the definitions. This appendix carries the bytes: the
running example,
Alice’s Q3 board packet, as the protocol exhibits an implementer would
actually see. The drafts’ own examples follow a different task, an agent
reconciling Q3 invoices, with the same members on the wire. The family is proposed individual Internet-Drafts. Two are on the IETF datatracker: the OAuth binding as draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-01 and the Resource Access Profile as draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access-00. The rest are editor’s copies, and none is adopted by a working group. Exhibits follow the editor’s copies as of October 25, 2026 (commit ba509036 of the drafts repository). Exhibits 1 through 3 and 9 also match the published -01, and the drafts are the normative text. Standard OAuth
parameters that carry no Mission semantics are elided. Identifiers,
keys, and digests are illustrative, with two exceptions: intent_hash
and authority_hash reproduce byte for byte from the
test vector,
and the two parameter_digest values are real SHA-256 digests over the
JCS form of the parameter objects the exhibits name.
1. The proposal: Mission Intent via PAR
The shaper turned Alice’s request into a candidate Mission Intent
(From a Request to an Approved Mission),
and the client submits it through a Pushed Authorization Request. The mission_intent parameter value is the UTF-8 JSON serialization of the Submission envelope, {intent, evidence}, form-encoded on the wire. No Intent Submission Evidence rides in this example. The envelope’s intent member, which intent_hash covers, decoded:
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target_resources is the requested ceiling on which resources the derived authority may name. task_bounds are human-readable strings for Alice to read at approval, with no machine semantics. The Intent’s top level is closed. The AS refuses any member that neither the OAuth binding nor a companion it implements defines, with invalid_request.
The client MAY propose concrete authority as standard authorization_details alongside mission_intent, an untrusted proposal committed by the conditional proposal_hash and only ever narrowed. Alice’s client proposes none. It proposes a task, and the Authorization Server derives the authority.
2. The pivot: the approved record
The Authorization Server validates the Intent, derives the Authority
Set (query_financials, create_doc, notify_reviewer), renders the
disclosure, and on Alice’s approval commits the Mission atomically.
No authority was proposed, so the AS derives the set in
configured-mapping mode: the mapping configured for the board-packet
purpose binds the current reporting period (Q3 2026), the
board-packet template, and the audit-committee group, within the
Intent’s target_resources. The task_bounds are shown to Alice
beside the result; the AS does not read them. The
concrete record
lives in the Reference. The two anchors it commits stay on the record.
Later exhibits identify the Mission by id and issuer alone, and an
authorized introspection caller can receive authority_hash.
| Anchor | Value |
|---|---|
intent_hash | sha-256:yTr3AQ0Yz9H2e8QQE9IbLV96mlQ4tGZvpDfQrbkk-Gw |
authority_hash | sha-256:4hRwrGkW9Jdjbkj1oHJ3opg9HRvmRe30k7TQmUfiIpY |
3. The projection: a Mission-bound token
The agent asks for authority to read the financials. Issuance is a
derivation, gated on the Mission being active, and the response
echoes the narrowed grant, the mission_id reference, and the
Mission’s effective expiry as mission_expires_at, which expires_in
does not report. The entries use the mission_resource_access type the
Mission Resource Access Profile defines. In these exhibits each
service’s operation contract identifies the service’s URL, such as
https://finance.example.com, as the operation target, and an entry’s
actions and constraints determine the permitted operations within
that service:
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The decoded access-token claims carry the projection: a subset of the
Authority Set, a sender-constraint key, and the mission claim that
binds the credential back to the governance record. The claim
identifies the Mission and carries neither anchor. The Resource Server
enforces the carried authorization_details, and checking them against
the complete approved set takes Mission Approved-Set Verification. The
token’s exp is minutes away and the Mission’s expires_at is weeks
away, so the authority outlives the credential, as the Durability law
requires.
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4. The gate: an AuthZEN permit, bound to parameters
By 18:05 the review draft is done, and the agent notifies the audit
committee, with a final pass on the packet queued for overnight. The
notify is externally visible, so the PEP at workflow.example.com
asks the PDP before acting (Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement,
AuthZEN Profile).
The PEP establishes resource.properties.operation_target from its
trusted operation contract, and only that value is matched against the
approved entry’s resource. audience is the enforcement boundary’s
identifier, set from trusted routing and used for the audience check
only. Here both carry https://workflow.example.com, the operation
target the workflow service’s contract identifies. The parameters,
their digest, and the idempotency key a non-idempotent external
commitment requires ride in action.properties. The Mission, its state observation, the
actor, and the credential ride in context. The credential carries the
key confirmation the PEP verified, which the permit binds, and its own
entries as authority, which the PDP checks the action against
independently of the Mission’s set. Without them the PDP denies
credential_invalid. This deployment places state establishment with
the PEP, so the PEP supplies
mission_state_observation, its state and freshness in one snapshot:
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The permit comes back bound to exactly those parameters, and limited to one use because deployment policy classes the notify as an external commitment:
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The response echoes no class label and no policy view. The PDP records
the class it applied (external_commitment, assigned by deployment
policy) and the view it evaluated in Decision Evidence, joined to this
permit by evaluation_id. The executing PEP recomputes the digest
against the parameters it is about to use, so a message changed after
the permit mismatches the digest and the PEP refuses, which closes the
TOCTOU gap.
5. The refusal: parameter_violation
Steered by a prompt-injected document, the agent tries the same notify
(same message) against a different audience, the press-list group.
The attempt is a new intended execution under a fresh
idempotency_key, so the PDP evaluates its parameters rather than
refusing a reused key. The Authority Set’s constraint names
audit-committee, so the evaluation succeeds and the decision is no:
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A denial is a successful evaluation, not a transport error. The
response names the reason and marks the refusal terminal. The request
carried the digest of the changed parameters,
sha-256:_0sG_Vm6EFHvqL5MMNYp-iL1KXXW5CGMr3NLXcXbKrc, and Decision
Evidence records it with the failing group constraint in
contributing_constraints, joined by the same evaluation_id
discipline as a permit.
6. The stop: revocation by mission_id
At 23:00 the board meeting is cancelled and an administrator ends the
task at the lifecycle endpoint (Mission Lifecycle and Change).
One authenticated call, keyed by the Mission, touching no token. The
administrator’s console presents a DPoP-bound access token carrying the
mission_lifecycle scope, audience-restricted to the lifecycle
endpoint, with its DPoP proof:
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7. The announcement: a lifecycle event
Subscribed consumers learn the transition through the
Signals push, a Security Event Token whose strictly monotonic
version makes replayed or reordered events harmless. Its required
expires_at lets a consumer that only receives events fail safe on
the Mission’s expiry without a Status fetch. The registered event type
URI keys the events member, and mission.lifecycle-change, the name
the prose uses, is the Signals profile’s short name for it. The
termination object carries the registered reason, and the top-level
reason is free text for audit. Decoded:
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8. The check that stops the resume
At 02:00 the harness wakes to run the queued final pass and, before
dispatching anything, establishes current Mission state
(The Agent Runtime and Audit).
It needs state, not audience-scoped authority, so it omits audience
and the AS addresses the state-only response to the requester, the
agent’s client s6BhdRkqt3. The
response’s version, 2, is the state counter the lifecycle event
carried. The signed Status response reports the Mission terminated with
reason revoked, which no credential in the session can report.
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The harness suppresses the resume and emits the evidence record the agent runtime part shows. The session itself could still have resumed, so Mission state, not session state, decided the outcome.
9. The refresh the AS refuses
The harness checked state before it acted. A client that skips that
check and tries to renew its access token with the refresh token from
exhibit 3 reaches the same answer at the token endpoint, because a
refresh is a derivation and issuance is gated on the Mission being
active (Mission-Bound Authority):
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The OAuth binding refuses a derivation under a Mission that is not
active with invalid_request on a Token Exchange and with
invalid_grant on code redemption and refresh, and it refuses the same
way any derivation the AS answers after it has acknowledged a
revocation. The 400 status is RFC 6749’s for invalid_grant.
mission_error is diagnostic and goes only to the authenticated
client. Its value is the Mission’s termination reason, here revoked
rather than expired or superseded, and a client that does not
recognize the member or its value ignores it.
The signals beside the exhibits
The OAuth binding and five of its companions name token-layer signals
for the paths these exhibits cross. Exhibit 9 shows the first,
mission_error. The rest appear in no exhibit:
| Signal | Where it rides | What it says | Defined by |
|---|---|---|---|
mission_error | Token endpoint error | Which gate refused the request. For a non-active Mission the value is its termination reason (revoked, expired, superseded, completed, or parent_terminated) or suspended, which reports a refusal a resume can lift. derivations_exhausted says the derivation limit is spent | The OAuth binding (revoked, expired, superseded); Status and Lifecycle (suspended, completed); Child Delegation (parent_terminated); Derivation Limits (exhausted) |
derivations_remaining | Introspection, to a caller granted that member’s disclosure | The derivations left under the Mission’s derivation_limit | Derivation Limits |
mission_denial | WWW-Authenticate | Whether a resource denial is insufficient_authority (more needs a new approval or an Expansion) or constraint_unrecognized (the resource cannot enforce an applicable constraint, which no retry, step-up, or approval repairs) | The OAuth binding |
mission_constraints_supported | Protected-resource metadata | Which constraints keys, Common Constraints and deployment-defined names, the resource understands and enforces | Resource Access Profile |
mission_not_active | Issuance-grant endpoint error at a standalone MAS, HTTP 409, to the authenticated recorded client | The Mission is not active, during a suspension and after termination alike. The Mission’s state tells the two apart, and only a suspension can be lifted, by a resume and a fresh grant | Mission Issuance Grant |
A partial derivation needs no signal of its own. The granted
authorization_details echoed in the token response (exhibit 3) state
what was granted. A weak or stale user authentication is not a
Mission denial either. The Resource Server answers it with RFC 9470’s
insufficient_user_authentication challenge. Exhibit 3 also shows two
token-response members: the mission_id echo, a SHOULD, and
mission_expires_at, which MUST appear on the first response that
delivers a new Mission’s identifier. The mission claim can carry an
OPTIONAL expires_at member, a bounding commitment with no liveness,
so it never extends reliance and current state still comes from a
freshness source.
The runtime layer names its own reasons, and the carrier says where in
the flow each one arose. A refusal before evaluation is a Refusal
Record, and either the PEP or the PDP can emit one. The PEP emits it
before it sends a decision request, for example token_invalid or
target_unresolvable. The PDP emits it when a request arrives with
input it cannot evaluate. A malformed context.work_item, for
example, is recorded as work_item_invalid and never as an evaluated
denial. An evaluated denial rides the AuthZEN response’s
context.reason and Decision Evidence’s denial_reason, and the PDP
emits both. A refusal at use, under a permit already issued, is
Execution Evidence with outcome suppressed and the reason in
error, emitted by the executing PEP before any effect is released. Exhibit 5 shows
parameter_violation. Of the reasons below, only stale_state and a
duplicate_suppressed whose prior claim is unresolved carry
next_action: retry. An out_of_authority or approval_required
denial carries next_action: request with an access request where the
deployment exposes it as requestable. Every other reason is terminal
for the attempted action:
| Reason | Where it rides | Who emits it | What it says | Retry | Defined by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
out_of_authority | PDP denial | PDP | The action is outside the Authority Set or outside the presented credential’s own authority, and Decision Evidence records which | Terminal, or requestable where exposed | AuthZEN Profile |
approval_required | PDP denial | PDP | Deployment or Resource policy requires an action-bound approval for the action, and the request presents none | Terminal, or requestable where exposed. After approval the PEP re-evaluates | AuthZEN Profile |
parameter_violation | PDP denial (exhibit 5) | PDP | A parameter violates a constraint the PDP evaluated, the digest does not match, or a required digest is absent | Terminal | AuthZEN Profile |
mission_inactive | PDP denial | PDP | The Mission is not active, including a passed expires_at | Terminal. After a resume, a fresh evaluation decides again | AuthZEN Profile |
stale_state | PDP denial | PDP | The Mission state the decision relies on is outside the staleness bound, cannot be established, or carries a different state version | Retry where a fresh read is expected to resolve it | AuthZEN Profile |
mission_binding_failed | PDP denial | PDP | Under a standalone MAS, the presented credential does not join to the referenced Mission | Terminal | AuthZEN Profile, with the join rules in the Mission Authority Server |
mission_reference_conflict | PDP denial, or a Refusal Record when the PEP finds the conflict before any evaluation | PDP, or the PEP before evaluation | Reference sources name different Missions, or a reference is malformed or missing where governance requires one | Terminal | Mission Authority Server |
duplicate_suppressed | PDP denial | PDP | The idempotency key and operation identity match a prior claim | Retry while the prior claim is unresolved, terminal once it completed | AuthZEN Profile |
idempotency_conflict | PDP denial | PDP | The idempotency key was reused for a different operation | Terminal | AuthZEN Profile |
work_item_context_missing | PDP denial | PDP | Work-item attribution is claimed for the action’s class, and the request carries no context.work_item | Terminal | AuthZEN Profile |
capability_drift | PDP denial | PDP | The capability definition presented at decision time no longer matches the source digest recorded at derivation | Terminal | Capability Binding |
resource_contract_drift | PDP denial | PDP | A resource contract applies, and the entry’s pinned reference is missing, does not resolve, or differs from the request’s | Terminal | AuthZEN Profile |
authority_contained | PDP denial, and optionally mission_denial_reason at the token endpoint | PDP, or the AS at the token endpoint | The authority was approved for this Mission and is currently contained | Terminal. Only a successor Mission restores it | Containment (experimental) |
authority_discharged | PDP denial | PDP | The entry was approved and its completion condition fired, so the Mission Issuer discharged it | Terminal | Entry Discharge |
token_invalid | Refusal Record, before any decision request | PEP | Token validation failed | Terminal for the attempt | Mission Runtime Evidence |
mission_claim_missing | Refusal Record, before any decision request | PEP | The required mission claim is absent. Where the deployment binds the Mission externally, as under a standalone MAS, the join governs instead | Terminal for the attempt | Mission Runtime Evidence |
target_unresolvable | Refusal Record, before any decision request | PEP | The request names a target object the enforcement surface cannot resolve, or the PEP cannot establish one unambiguous operation target | Terminal for the attempt | Mission Runtime Evidence |
evaluation_context_unresolvable | Refusal Record, before any decision request | PEP | The operation is under Evaluation-Context Binding, and the PEP cannot capture its authoritative context | Terminal for the attempt | Mission Runtime Evidence |
parameter_mismatch | Execution Evidence error, outcome suppressed | Executing PEP | The effective parameters at execution differ from those the permit bound | Terminal for that permit | Mission Runtime Evidence |
target_drift | Execution Evidence error, outcome suppressed | Executing PEP | The operation target, or a bound evaluation context, differs from what the permit was evaluated for or cannot be established at use | Terminal for that permit | Mission Runtime Evidence |
work_item_mismatch | Execution Evidence error, outcome suppressed | Executing PEP | The permit’s work-item condition differs from the work item attributed to the executing request | Terminal for that permit | Mission Runtime Evidence |
The inactive-Mission reason has two spellings. The AuthZEN Profile’s
PDP denial is mission_inactive. The Mission Issuance Grant’s
grant-endpoint error is mission_not_active, and the harness draft’s
evidence example uses the same string in its free-text reason
member, so a consumer that joins harness, MAS, and PDP records matches
both. The AuthZEN Profile’s
failure-condition coverage
maps every runtime condition to its carrier, and a consumer treats a
reason it does not recognize as a deny.
Where each exhibit is normative
The OAuth binding
owns exhibits 1 through 3, the refusal in exhibit 9, and the integrity anchors, and the
Mission Resource Access Profile
owns the mission_resource_access entries they carry. The
runtime core
and its AuthZEN Profile
own 4 and 5, the runtime’s
OAuth 2.0 Profile
maps the validated access token onto the decision inputs, and
Mission Runtime Evidence
owns the Decision Evidence they cite.
Status and Lifecycle
owns 6 and 8, and Lifecycle Signals
owns 7. Where an exhibit and a draft disagree, the draft wins, and the
Field Reference is the
citable summary of the whole model.