The architecture chapter carries the argument, the Building Mission-Bound Authorization chapter carries the controls this appendix accompanies, and the Field Reference carries the definitions. This appendix carries the bytes: the running example, Alice’s Q3 board packet, as the protocol exhibits an implementer would actually see. The drafts’ own examples follow a different task, an agent reconciling Q3 invoices, with the same members on the wire. The family is proposed individual Internet-Drafts. Two are on the IETF datatracker: the OAuth binding as draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-01 and the Resource Access Profile as draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access-00. The rest are editor’s copies, and none is adopted by a working group. Exhibits follow the editor’s copies as of October 25, 2026 (commit ba509036 of the drafts repository). Exhibits 1 through 3 and 9 also match the published -01, and the drafts are the normative text. Standard OAuth parameters that carry no Mission semantics are elided. Identifiers, keys, and digests are illustrative, with two exceptions: intent_hash and authority_hash reproduce byte for byte from the test vector, and the two parameter_digest values are real SHA-256 digests over the JCS form of the parameter objects the exhibits name.

1. The proposal: Mission Intent via PAR

The shaper turned Alice’s request into a candidate Mission Intent (From a Request to an Approved Mission), and the client submits it through a Pushed Authorization Request. The mission_intent parameter value is the UTF-8 JSON serialization of the Submission envelope, {intent, evidence}, form-encoded on the wire. No Intent Submission Evidence rides in this example. The envelope’s intent member, which intent_hash covers, decoded:

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{
  "goal": "Prepare the Q3 board packet for the audit committee",
  "purpose": "urn:example:mission:board-packet",
  "target_resources": ["https://finance.example.com",
    "https://docs.example.com",
    "https://workflow.example.com"],
  "task_bounds": ["Q3 2026", "Example Corp", "confidential"],
  "expires_at": "2026-10-15T18:00:00Z"
}

target_resources is the requested ceiling on which resources the derived authority may name. task_bounds are human-readable strings for Alice to read at approval, with no machine semantics. The Intent’s top level is closed. The AS refuses any member that neither the OAuth binding nor a companion it implements defines, with invalid_request.

The client MAY propose concrete authority as standard authorization_details alongside mission_intent, an untrusted proposal committed by the conditional proposal_hash and only ever narrowed. Alice’s client proposes none. It proposes a task, and the Authorization Server derives the authority.

2. The pivot: the approved record

The Authorization Server validates the Intent, derives the Authority Set (query_financials, create_doc, notify_reviewer), renders the disclosure, and on Alice’s approval commits the Mission atomically. No authority was proposed, so the AS derives the set in configured-mapping mode: the mapping configured for the board-packet purpose binds the current reporting period (Q3 2026), the board-packet template, and the audit-committee group, within the Intent’s target_resources. The task_bounds are shown to Alice beside the result; the AS does not read them. The concrete record lives in the Reference. The two anchors it commits stay on the record. Later exhibits identify the Mission by id and issuer alone, and an authorized introspection caller can receive authority_hash.

AnchorValue
intent_hashsha-256:yTr3AQ0Yz9H2e8QQE9IbLV96mlQ4tGZvpDfQrbkk-Gw
authority_hashsha-256:4hRwrGkW9Jdjbkj1oHJ3opg9HRvmRe30k7TQmUfiIpY

3. The projection: a Mission-bound token

The agent asks for authority to read the financials. Issuance is a derivation, gated on the Mission being active, and the response echoes the narrowed grant, the mission_id reference, and the Mission’s effective expiry as mission_expires_at, which expires_in does not report. The entries use the mission_resource_access type the Mission Resource Access Profile defines. In these exhibits each service’s operation contract identifies the service’s URL, such as https://finance.example.com, as the operation target, and an entry’s actions and constraints determine the permitted operations within that service:

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{
  "access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6ImF0K2p3dCJ9...",
  "token_type": "DPoP",
  "expires_in": 300,
  "refresh_token": "rt_7Hc2Lw9pQ4xN1vB6mK8s",
  "mission_id": "msn_Y89D4gqD9lDfw2cn6qqSO4C9j8o63Z2p",
  "mission_expires_at": "2026-10-15T18:00:00Z",
  "authorization_details": [
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://finance.example.com",
      "actions": ["query_financials"],
      "constraints": { "period": "Q3 2026" } }
  ]
}

The decoded access-token claims carry the projection: a subset of the Authority Set, a sender-constraint key, and the mission claim that binds the credential back to the governance record. The claim identifies the Mission and carries neither anchor. The Resource Server enforces the carried authorization_details, and checking them against the complete approved set takes Mission Approved-Set Verification. The token’s exp is minutes away and the Mission’s expires_at is weeks away, so the authority outlives the credential, as the Durability law requires.

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{
  "iss": "https://as.example.com",
  "sub": "alice@example.com",
  "aud": "https://finance.example.com",
  "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "iat": 1790787780,
  "exp": 1790788080,
  "jti": "at_3Vq8nK2xT6mR9sY1pZ4d",
  "authorization_details": [
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://finance.example.com",
      "actions": ["query_financials"],
      "constraints": { "period": "Q3 2026" } }
  ],
  "cnf": { "jkt": "0ZcOCORZNYy-DWpqq30jZyJGHTN0d2HglBV3uiguA4I" },
  "mission": {
    "id": "msn_Y89D4gqD9lDfw2cn6qqSO4C9j8o63Z2p",
    "issuer": "https://as.example.com"
  }
}

4. The gate: an AuthZEN permit, bound to parameters

By 18:05 the review draft is done, and the agent notifies the audit committee, with a final pass on the packet queued for overnight. The notify is externally visible, so the PEP at workflow.example.com asks the PDP before acting (Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement, AuthZEN Profile). The PEP establishes resource.properties.operation_target from its trusted operation contract, and only that value is matched against the approved entry’s resource. audience is the enforcement boundary’s identifier, set from trusted routing and used for the audience check only. Here both carry https://workflow.example.com, the operation target the workflow service’s contract identifies. The parameters, their digest, and the idempotency key a non-idempotent external commitment requires ride in action.properties. The Mission, its state observation, the actor, and the credential ride in context. The credential carries the key confirmation the PEP verified, which the permit binds, and its own entries as authority, which the PDP checks the action against independently of the Mission’s set. Without them the PDP denies credential_invalid. This deployment places state establishment with the PEP, so the PEP supplies mission_state_observation, its state and freshness in one snapshot:

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{
  "subject": {
    "type": "user",
    "id": "alice@example.com",
    "properties": { "iss": "https://login.example.com" }
  },
  "resource": {
    "type": "notification",
    "id": "notif_board_packet_q3",
    "properties": {
      "audience": "https://workflow.example.com",
      "operation_target": "https://workflow.example.com"
    }
  },
  "action": {
    "name": "notify_reviewer",
    "properties": {
      "parameters": {
        "group": "audit-committee",
        "message": "Q3 board packet is ready for review"
      },
      "parameter_digest":
        "sha-256:DCTAlrBUhQwW_t1EDxHCjdNkLbrT_Bc6nCLYkQubRU4",
      "idempotency_key": "idk_4Tn8wQ2mR6vX1sK9pB3zL7"
    }
  },
  "context": {
    "mission": {
      "id": "msn_Y89D4gqD9lDfw2cn6qqSO4C9j8o63Z2p",
      "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
      "policy_version": "deploy-policy:v17",
      "policy_view_id":
        "sha-256:CMcisP1vVPsdDxWs336YmmKoBLFgMro1SYVJJEK4sV8"
    },
    "mission_state_observation": {
      "state": "active",
      "mode": "fresh",
      "freshness_at": "2026-09-30T18:05:00Z"
    },
    "actor": { "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3" },
    "credential": {
      "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
      "expires_at": "2026-09-30T18:09:00Z",
      "confirmation": {
        "jkt": "0ZcOCORZNYy-DWpqq30jZyJGHTN0d2HglBV3uiguA4I"
      },
      "authority": [
        { "type": "mission_resource_access",
          "resource": "https://workflow.example.com",
          "actions": ["notify_reviewer"],
          "constraints": { "group": "audit-committee" } }
      ]
    }
  }
}

The permit comes back bound to exactly those parameters, and limited to one use because deployment policy classes the notify as an external commitment:

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{
  "decision": true,
  "context": {
    "evaluation_id": "dec_2FpQ8kV5nR1tX7mB4sJ9eL6wYc",
    "conditions": {
      "parameter_digest":
        "sha-256:DCTAlrBUhQwW_t1EDxHCjdNkLbrT_Bc6nCLYkQubRU4",
      "valid_until": "2026-09-30T18:06:00Z",
      "use_limit": 1
    }
  }
}

The response echoes no class label and no policy view. The PDP records the class it applied (external_commitment, assigned by deployment policy) and the view it evaluated in Decision Evidence, joined to this permit by evaluation_id. The executing PEP recomputes the digest against the parameters it is about to use, so a message changed after the permit mismatches the digest and the PEP refuses, which closes the TOCTOU gap.

5. The refusal: parameter_violation

Steered by a prompt-injected document, the agent tries the same notify (same message) against a different audience, the press-list group. The attempt is a new intended execution under a fresh idempotency_key, so the PDP evaluates its parameters rather than refusing a reused key. The Authority Set’s constraint names audit-committee, so the evaluation succeeds and the decision is no:

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{
  "decision": false,
  "context": {
    "evaluation_id": "dec_6JwN3xT9rQ4mV8kP1sB5eZ2yLd",
    "reason": "parameter_violation",
    "next_action": "none"
  }
}

A denial is a successful evaluation, not a transport error. The response names the reason and marks the refusal terminal. The request carried the digest of the changed parameters, sha-256:_0sG_Vm6EFHvqL5MMNYp-iL1KXXW5CGMr3NLXcXbKrc, and Decision Evidence records it with the failing group constraint in contributing_constraints, joined by the same evaluation_id discipline as a permit.

6. The stop: revocation by mission_id

At 23:00 the board meeting is cancelled and an administrator ends the task at the lifecycle endpoint (Mission Lifecycle and Change). One authenticated call, keyed by the Mission, touching no token. The administrator’s console presents a DPoP-bound access token carrying the mission_lifecycle scope, audience-restricted to the lifecycle endpoint, with its DPoP proof:

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POST /as/mission/lifecycle HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6...
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

mission_id=msn_Y89D4gqD9lDfw2cn6qqSO4C9j8o63Z2p
&operation=revoke
&reason=Board+meeting+cancelled
&nonce=nonce_8Y3vN0sM6tP1xR9bQ5

7. The announcement: a lifecycle event

Subscribed consumers learn the transition through the Signals push, a Security Event Token whose strictly monotonic version makes replayed or reordered events harmless. Its required expires_at lets a consumer that only receives events fail safe on the Mission’s expiry without a Status fetch. The registered event type URI keys the events member, and mission.lifecycle-change, the name the prose uses, is the Signals profile’s short name for it. The termination object carries the registered reason, and the top-level reason is free text for audit. Decoded:

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{
  "iss": "https://as.example.com",
  "aud": "https://workflow.example.com",
  "jti": "set_5R8wQ2kN7mX4vT1pB6zJ3e",
  "iat": 1790809200,
  "sub_id": {
    "format": "opaque",
    "id": "msn_Y89D4gqD9lDfw2cn6qqSO4C9j8o63Z2p"
  },
  "events": {
    "https://schemas.karlmcguinness.com/mission/lifecycle-change": {
      "mission": {
        "id": "msn_Y89D4gqD9lDfw2cn6qqSO4C9j8o63Z2p",
        "issuer": "https://as.example.com"
      },
      "prior_state": "active",
      "state": "terminated",
      "termination": {
        "reason": "revoked",
        "terminated_at": "2026-09-30T23:00:00Z",
        "version": 2
      },
      "version": 2,
      "committed_at": "2026-09-30T23:00:00Z",
      "expires_at": "2026-10-15T18:00:00Z",
      "reason": "Board meeting cancelled"
    }
  }
}

8. The check that stops the resume

At 02:00 the harness wakes to run the queued final pass and, before dispatching anything, establishes current Mission state (The Agent Runtime and Audit). It needs state, not audience-scoped authority, so it omits audience and the AS addresses the state-only response to the requester, the agent’s client s6BhdRkqt3. The response’s version, 2, is the state counter the lifecycle event carried. The signed Status response reports the Mission terminated with reason revoked, which no credential in the session can report.

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{
  "iss": "https://as.example.com",
  "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "sub": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "nonce": "nonce_K9pV4nT2sR7mB1xQ",
  "iat": 1790820005,
  "exp": 1790820065,
  "mission": {
    "id": "msn_Y89D4gqD9lDfw2cn6qqSO4C9j8o63Z2p",
    "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
    "state": "terminated",
    "termination": {
      "reason": "revoked",
      "terminated_at": "2026-09-30T23:00:00Z",
      "version": 2
    },
    "version": 2,
    "expires_at": "2026-10-15T18:00:00Z",
    "fresh_until": "2026-10-01T02:01:05Z"
  }
}

The harness suppresses the resume and emits the evidence record the agent runtime part shows. The session itself could still have resumed, so Mission state, not session state, decided the outcome.

9. The refresh the AS refuses

The harness checked state before it acted. A client that skips that check and tries to renew its access token with the refresh token from exhibit 3 reaches the same answer at the token endpoint, because a refresh is a derivation and issuance is gated on the Mission being active (Mission-Bound Authority):

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POST /as/token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

grant_type=refresh_token
&refresh_token=rt_7Hc2Lw9pQ4xN1vB6mK8s
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HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "error": "invalid_grant",
  "mission_error": "revoked"
}

The OAuth binding refuses a derivation under a Mission that is not active with invalid_request on a Token Exchange and with invalid_grant on code redemption and refresh, and it refuses the same way any derivation the AS answers after it has acknowledged a revocation. The 400 status is RFC 6749’s for invalid_grant. mission_error is diagnostic and goes only to the authenticated client. Its value is the Mission’s termination reason, here revoked rather than expired or superseded, and a client that does not recognize the member or its value ignores it.

The signals beside the exhibits

The OAuth binding and five of its companions name token-layer signals for the paths these exhibits cross. Exhibit 9 shows the first, mission_error. The rest appear in no exhibit:

SignalWhere it ridesWhat it saysDefined by
mission_errorToken endpoint errorWhich gate refused the request. For a non-active Mission the value is its termination reason (revoked, expired, superseded, completed, or parent_terminated) or suspended, which reports a refusal a resume can lift. derivations_exhausted says the derivation limit is spentThe OAuth binding (revoked, expired, superseded); Status and Lifecycle (suspended, completed); Child Delegation (parent_terminated); Derivation Limits (exhausted)
derivations_remainingIntrospection, to a caller granted that member’s disclosureThe derivations left under the Mission’s derivation_limitDerivation Limits
mission_denialWWW-AuthenticateWhether a resource denial is insufficient_authority (more needs a new approval or an Expansion) or constraint_unrecognized (the resource cannot enforce an applicable constraint, which no retry, step-up, or approval repairs)The OAuth binding
mission_constraints_supportedProtected-resource metadataWhich constraints keys, Common Constraints and deployment-defined names, the resource understands and enforcesResource Access Profile
mission_not_activeIssuance-grant endpoint error at a standalone MAS, HTTP 409, to the authenticated recorded clientThe Mission is not active, during a suspension and after termination alike. The Mission’s state tells the two apart, and only a suspension can be lifted, by a resume and a fresh grantMission Issuance Grant

A partial derivation needs no signal of its own. The granted authorization_details echoed in the token response (exhibit 3) state what was granted. A weak or stale user authentication is not a Mission denial either. The Resource Server answers it with RFC 9470’s insufficient_user_authentication challenge. Exhibit 3 also shows two token-response members: the mission_id echo, a SHOULD, and mission_expires_at, which MUST appear on the first response that delivers a new Mission’s identifier. The mission claim can carry an OPTIONAL expires_at member, a bounding commitment with no liveness, so it never extends reliance and current state still comes from a freshness source.

The runtime layer names its own reasons, and the carrier says where in the flow each one arose. A refusal before evaluation is a Refusal Record, and either the PEP or the PDP can emit one. The PEP emits it before it sends a decision request, for example token_invalid or target_unresolvable. The PDP emits it when a request arrives with input it cannot evaluate. A malformed context.work_item, for example, is recorded as work_item_invalid and never as an evaluated denial. An evaluated denial rides the AuthZEN response’s context.reason and Decision Evidence’s denial_reason, and the PDP emits both. A refusal at use, under a permit already issued, is Execution Evidence with outcome suppressed and the reason in error, emitted by the executing PEP before any effect is released. Exhibit 5 shows parameter_violation. Of the reasons below, only stale_state and a duplicate_suppressed whose prior claim is unresolved carry next_action: retry. An out_of_authority or approval_required denial carries next_action: request with an access request where the deployment exposes it as requestable. Every other reason is terminal for the attempted action:

ReasonWhere it ridesWho emits itWhat it saysRetryDefined by
out_of_authorityPDP denialPDPThe action is outside the Authority Set or outside the presented credential’s own authority, and Decision Evidence records whichTerminal, or requestable where exposedAuthZEN Profile
approval_requiredPDP denialPDPDeployment or Resource policy requires an action-bound approval for the action, and the request presents noneTerminal, or requestable where exposed. After approval the PEP re-evaluatesAuthZEN Profile
parameter_violationPDP denial (exhibit 5)PDPA parameter violates a constraint the PDP evaluated, the digest does not match, or a required digest is absentTerminalAuthZEN Profile
mission_inactivePDP denialPDPThe Mission is not active, including a passed expires_atTerminal. After a resume, a fresh evaluation decides againAuthZEN Profile
stale_statePDP denialPDPThe Mission state the decision relies on is outside the staleness bound, cannot be established, or carries a different state versionRetry where a fresh read is expected to resolve itAuthZEN Profile
mission_binding_failedPDP denialPDPUnder a standalone MAS, the presented credential does not join to the referenced MissionTerminalAuthZEN Profile, with the join rules in the Mission Authority Server
mission_reference_conflictPDP denial, or a Refusal Record when the PEP finds the conflict before any evaluationPDP, or the PEP before evaluationReference sources name different Missions, or a reference is malformed or missing where governance requires oneTerminalMission Authority Server
duplicate_suppressedPDP denialPDPThe idempotency key and operation identity match a prior claimRetry while the prior claim is unresolved, terminal once it completedAuthZEN Profile
idempotency_conflictPDP denialPDPThe idempotency key was reused for a different operationTerminalAuthZEN Profile
work_item_context_missingPDP denialPDPWork-item attribution is claimed for the action’s class, and the request carries no context.work_itemTerminalAuthZEN Profile
capability_driftPDP denialPDPThe capability definition presented at decision time no longer matches the source digest recorded at derivationTerminalCapability Binding
resource_contract_driftPDP denialPDPA resource contract applies, and the entry’s pinned reference is missing, does not resolve, or differs from the request’sTerminalAuthZEN Profile
authority_containedPDP denial, and optionally mission_denial_reason at the token endpointPDP, or the AS at the token endpointThe authority was approved for this Mission and is currently containedTerminal. Only a successor Mission restores itContainment (experimental)
authority_dischargedPDP denialPDPThe entry was approved and its completion condition fired, so the Mission Issuer discharged itTerminalEntry Discharge
token_invalidRefusal Record, before any decision requestPEPToken validation failedTerminal for the attemptMission Runtime Evidence
mission_claim_missingRefusal Record, before any decision requestPEPThe required mission claim is absent. Where the deployment binds the Mission externally, as under a standalone MAS, the join governs insteadTerminal for the attemptMission Runtime Evidence
target_unresolvableRefusal Record, before any decision requestPEPThe request names a target object the enforcement surface cannot resolve, or the PEP cannot establish one unambiguous operation targetTerminal for the attemptMission Runtime Evidence
evaluation_context_unresolvableRefusal Record, before any decision requestPEPThe operation is under Evaluation-Context Binding, and the PEP cannot capture its authoritative contextTerminal for the attemptMission Runtime Evidence
parameter_mismatchExecution Evidence error, outcome suppressedExecuting PEPThe effective parameters at execution differ from those the permit boundTerminal for that permitMission Runtime Evidence
target_driftExecution Evidence error, outcome suppressedExecuting PEPThe operation target, or a bound evaluation context, differs from what the permit was evaluated for or cannot be established at useTerminal for that permitMission Runtime Evidence
work_item_mismatchExecution Evidence error, outcome suppressedExecuting PEPThe permit’s work-item condition differs from the work item attributed to the executing requestTerminal for that permitMission Runtime Evidence

The inactive-Mission reason has two spellings. The AuthZEN Profile’s PDP denial is mission_inactive. The Mission Issuance Grant’s grant-endpoint error is mission_not_active, and the harness draft’s evidence example uses the same string in its free-text reason member, so a consumer that joins harness, MAS, and PDP records matches both. The AuthZEN Profile’s failure-condition coverage maps every runtime condition to its carrier, and a consumer treats a reason it does not recognize as a deny.

Where each exhibit is normative

The OAuth binding owns exhibits 1 through 3, the refusal in exhibit 9, and the integrity anchors, and the Mission Resource Access Profile owns the mission_resource_access entries they carry. The runtime core and its AuthZEN Profile own 4 and 5, the runtime’s OAuth 2.0 Profile maps the validated access token onto the decision inputs, and Mission Runtime Evidence owns the Decision Evidence they cite. Status and Lifecycle owns 6 and 8, and Lifecycle Signals owns 7. Where an exhibit and a draft disagree, the draft wins, and the Field Reference is the citable summary of the whole model.